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Neutrality in Austria's Foreign 
and Security Policy after the Cold War
Abstract
After the end of the Cold War, neutrality was redefi ned by adapting 
its functioning to the unprecedented changes in the international 
environment. This redefi nition covered two key areas; the change in 
attitudes towards international confl icts and the rejection of the principles 
of economic neutrality. By joining the EU, Austria, as a perpetually neutral 
state, made a commitment to fully conform with its obligations arising 
from participating in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 
necessary changes to legal regulations have led to a departure from the 
principles of traditional neutrality and the actual change of international 
status to an alliance-free/post-neutral state. 
The main area of  main Austrian political forces’ dispute within foreign 
and security policy was the recognition of the possibility of abandonment 
of neutrality and NATO membership. It remains unresolved as to whether 
the rejection of neutrality constitutes solely a legal and constitutional issue. 
At the same time, Austrian society, with its fi rm pro-European attitude, 
still shows a strong commitment to neutrality.
Keywords: Austria, Perpetual Neutrality, Freedom from Alliances, Post-
-Neutrality, Foreign and Security Policy, European Union
Introduction
In May 2020, Austria will celebrate the 65th anniversary of regaining 
its sovereignty. It will be tantamount the lapse of 65 years since the 
establishment of perpetual neutrality of the country, however, it may 
be expected that this aspect will not be particularly exposed during the 
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celebration. The state recognized as Hitler’s fi rst victim had factually 
become a hostage to the growing divergences between the East and the 
West. In exchange for adopting the international status modelled on 
Switzerland, Austria returned to the international community and, in 
accordance with the provisions of the preamble to the State Treaty of 
1955, joined the UN. Initially, the country’s foreign policy encountered 
serious barriers related to unregulated relations with its neighbours and 
complicated international situation.
During the Cold War, Austria was perceived primarily through the 
prism of the so-called active neutrality policy of the 1970s, which led to 
the strengthening of the international position of the state as a political 
bridge between the East and the West. In the mid 1980s, Austria moved 
to the tracks of the so-called realistic neutrality policy. In addition to 
a signifi cant reduction in the scope and intensity of international activity, 
a strong trend to quickly resolve the issue of European integration was 
noticeable in that time. Taking into account the actual balance of political 
forces and the deep attachment of society to the international status of 
the country, in 1989 the Austrian government applied for membership 
in the European Community, emphasizing at the same time the status of 
perpetual neutrality.
 The purpose of the article is to present the evolution of the signifi cance 
of neutrality in Austria’s foreign security policy after the Cold War. The 
article verifi es the hypothesis indicating the possibility of effective 
rejection of neutrality in a foreseeable time perspective. The analysis takes 
into account the main internal and international conditions affecting 
Austrian neutrality/post-neutrality.
Redefi ning Austria’s Neutrality after the Cold War
It seems reasonable to believe that, in addition to rejecting economic 
neutrality, the new approach to armed confl icts has changed the neutrality 
paradigm following the Cold War. Until then, all confl icts were treated as 
wars in the classical sense, where the law of neutrality might be applied.1 
In the ongoing debate, it was pointed out that the neutral states functioned 
in a dual legal reality and, in fact, the existence of the two overlapping 
systems was accepted. The fi rst was based on the universally binding 
prohibition of wars, while the second was related to the application of 
1  Such interpretation is strongle related to the post-war Swiss practice, which is 
the effect of moving away from UN membership and progressive dogmatization of the 
principles of neutrality policy. D. Popławski, Szwajcarska polityka bezpieczeństwa (Swiss 
Security Policy), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2007.
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the law of neutrality derived from traditional law of war. This situation 
constituted a serious complication, especially for Austria, as a neutral 
member of the UN. From the point of view of international law, this was 
undoubtedly an unsatisfactory situation, but at the same time it created 
some opportunities for the functioning of the neutral state at the UN 
forum. 
The new approach to armed confl icts, also known as ‘Verdross doctrine’, 
called for the primacy of ‘the UN law’ over the law of neutrality.2 A dualistic 
approach was introduced with the aim to distinguish between war in the 
traditional meaning and confl ict in the meaning of the United Nations 
Charter. As soon as the UN is involved in a confl ict, the law of neutrality 
ceases to apply. In the event of a confl ict without the participation of the 
UN, its norms may be applied. Adoption by the governments of neutral 
states assumptions of the new concept also marked a breakthrough in the 
fi eld of participation in the implementation of UN military sanctions.3
The necessity to make fundamental decisions in the spirit of the new 
interpretation of neutrality came forward much faster than expected. 
There was signifi cant pressure from current developments connected 
with the Yugoslavian crisis as well as the war in Iraq. Austria found 
itself in a particularly diffi cult situation, being directly threatened by the 
dynamic development of the situation in the Balkans. The confl ict in the 
Persian Gulf also brought many problems after the UN Security Council 
asked for support for military and economic sanctions against Iraq. By 
introducing the necessary regulations in an accelerated manner, Austrian 
neutrality was subordinated to UN decisions. It was the result of applying 
in practice Verdross doctrine.4
2  The precursor of the new approach was Alfred Verdross who in the mid 1980s did 
not recognize UN coercive measures as acts of war and treated the law of war as not ap-
plicable in such cases; A. Verdross, B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (Universal inter-
national law), Duncker & Hublot, Berlin 1984, p. 148; Karl Zemanek advocated the law 
of neutrality not being applied because of the expectations of the international community. 
K Zemanek, The Changing International System A New Look a the Collective Security and 
Permanent Neutrality, “Austrian Journal of Public and International Law”, no. 42/1991.
3  See: D. Schindler, Sieben Thesen zur Neutralität (Seven theses on neutrality), in: 
Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz nach dem Jahrestausenden. Sieben Thesen zur künftigen 
Selbstbehauptungsstrategie der Schweiz (Switzerland‘s security policy after millennia. 
Seven theses on Switzerland‘s future self-assertion strategy), ed. G.G. Heliberger, Zürich 
1997, pp. 30–31.
4  A further consequence of these activities was sending Austrian contingent to the 
border region between Iraq and Kuwait and (in December 1995) dispatching mechanized 
transport unit under IFOR peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other 
hand, NATO considered its intervention in Kosovo justifi ed but refused to allow transit 
fl ights of aircrafts from NATO countries. In the justifi cation for this decision, the issue of 
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The second key component of the redefi nition of neutrality was rejection 
of economic neutrality, which paved the way for broad involvement in the 
European integration process. Since the very beginning of its existence, 
the European Union has not spoken clearly about the compatibility of 
the principles of neutrality with membership.5 The offi cial statements 
emphasized that it is the applicant state that should decide for itself 
whether membership is compatible with obligations arising from its 
international legal status. However, Austria’s neutrality was perceived 
in a particular way in Brussels. First of all, Austria had been showing 
a signifi cant gravity towards the European Communities long before, 
which distinguished it among other neutral countries of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA).6 However, its formal status of perpetual 
neutrality was also of importance, as it constituted a signifi cant obstacle 
for some member states.
Austria’s actions aimed at rejection of the concept of economic neutrality 
received understanding of Brussels. At the end of the 1980s, the opinions in 
Austria were increasingly heard that the law of neutrality should not constitute 
an obstacle to rejecting traditional principles of economic neutrality. In fact, 
there were few economic norms that were diffi cult to be defi ned within the 
law of neutrality, which could be reduced to just few principles. The Hague 
Conventions clearly distinguished between permitted economic support 
and prohibited military support. However, as the totalitarian nature of wars 
was progressing, the distinction was becoming increasingly unjustifi ed. 
Just like those related to trade in war materials by state-owned and private 
companies, which was only allowed for the latter. Taking into account 
contemporary conditions in the fi eld of arms control and steering arms 
export, it was questioned whether such division makes sense at all.7
the initial lack of UN mandate was pointed out as well as the fact that from the formal and 
legal points of view, it was a NATO mission and not a EU mission. During the Iraqi crisis, 
the US efforts to obtain permission for fl ights of combat aircrafts over Austrian territory 
did not succeed. This was justifi ed by the lack of a UN mandate A. Skuhra, Österreichis-
che Sicherheitspolitik (Austrian security policy), in: Politik in Österreich. Das Handbuch 
(Politics in Austria. The handbook), eds. H. Dachs, P. Gehrlich H., Gottweiss, H. Kramer, 
V. Lauber, W.C. Müller, E. Talos, Manz, Wien 2006, p. 856.
5  For more on the impact of the Community on European neutrality see: M. Gehler, 
R. Steiniger, Die Neutralen und die europäische Integration 1945–1994 (The Neutral and 
European Integration 1945–1994), Institut für die Zeitgeschichte der Universität. Arbeits-
kreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 3, Innsbruck–
Wien–Köln–Weimar 2000.
6  D. Popławski., Austriacka polityka neutralności (1955–1995) [Austrian Policy of 
Neutrality (1955–1995)], Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1995.
7  A.R Schaub, Neutralität und kollektive Sicherheit: Gegenüberstellung zweier unver-
einbarer Verhaltenskonzepte in bewaffneten Konfl ikten und These zu einem völkerrechtsge-
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The above arguments were part of a broad critique of the concept of 
economic neutrality and the progressing process of demythologizing the 
relationship between law and neutrality policy. It was also pointed out 
that the principles of economic neutrality were actually formulated on the 
basis of post-war Swiss doctrine and that the decisions on their application 
taken by Austria had a political dimension. It was argued that giving up 
their application should have the same nature.8 
 
Austria’s Neutrality Towards the Evolution 
of the EU Security Policy
By joining the EU in 1995, Austria was able to demonstrate many 
actions evidencing its willingness to engage in broadly understood 
common activities and to strengthen the crisis prevention and crisis 
management capabilities. First of all, it was about the basic regulations 
enabling dispatch of Austrian army units and individuals abroad. The 
new solution opened the way not only, as it had been so far, to activities 
within the UN but also within the EU and the OSCE. This regulation 
was interpreted in the context of freedom of decision making when 
introducing further changes related to Austrian neutrality.
The adjustment activities adopted were perceived as the necessary 
minimum associated with the EU membership and the resulting 
obligations in the fi eld of  foreign and security policy. In the absence of 
full knowledge of further development of the situation in this area and 
in light of the divergences on this matter between large member states, 
Austria adopted the assumptions of the so-called double strategy. Full 
compliance was declared within  the second pillar of the EU, while 
rejecting the possibility of extending the scope and intensity of military-
defence functions at the same time.9
mässen modus vivendi. Schriftenreihe des Institutes für Internationales Recht und Interna-
tionale Beziehungen (Neutrality and collective security: juxtaposition of two incompatible 
behavioral concepts in armed confl icts and thesis on a modus vivendi in accordance with 
international law. Publication series of the Institute for International Law and Internatio-
nal Relations), Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel, Basel, Frankfurt am Mein, 1995.
8  W. Hummer, M. Schweizer, Österreich und EEC. Neutralitätsrecht Beurteilung der 
Möglichkeit der Dynamisierung der Verhältnisse zur EEC (Austria and EEC. Neutrality 
law Assessment of the possibility of dynamizing relations with the EEC), Signum, Wien 
1987, p. 304.
9  Cf. P. Schmidt, Die neuen EU – Mitglieder Finnland, Österreich und Schweden, 
vor der Regierungskonferenz 1996. Sicherheitspolitische Ambivalenzen (The new EU 
members Finland, Austria and Sweden, before the 1996 IGC. Security policy ambiva-
lences), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen 1995, p. 15.
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Visible tensions between neutrality and the EU membership emerged 
when the Amsterdam Treaty outlined the prospects for the integration 
of the Western European Union (WEU) and the EU. Participation in 
Petersburg tasks and cooperation in the fi eld of arms arouse many doubts. 
At the same time, however, a broad debate on the matter pointed to the 
existence of protective mechanisms10 enabling the functioning of a neutral 
state within the EU. As a result of a political compromise between the main 
political forces of the country, a reservation was made, when ratifying the 
Amsterdam Treaty, regarding the need for a UN mandate for peacekeeping 
missions in which Austria would participate and the prohibition of active 
participation in peace-restoring operations was maintained.
The adaptation steps made in accordance with the new interpretation 
of neutrality did not, in essence, violate its basic substance, i.e. 
maintaining a neutral attitude in specifi c cases. Fundamental changes 
in this area were to take place along with the amendment of the 
constitution in 1999. It enabled participation in peace supporting 
operations within the EU and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The 
amendment had also a doctrinal dimension, as it confi rmed that Austria 
was not obliged to adopt neutral attitude in individual cases. This 
meant that the constitutional component of perpetual neutrality in the 
form of unconditional refraining from participating in armed confl icts 
actually disappeared. After the amendment, only the political option 
of neutral attitude has remained, but this is a completely different 
instrument than the general commitment to permanent neutrality.11 
The essence of these changes lies in the relativization of the principle 
of absolute prohibition of neutral state’s participation in war, while 
maintaining the prohibition of its membership in military pacts and 
joint defence. The main result of these regulations was the factual 
change of Austria’s international status to a alliance-free state (non-
alliance/post-neutral). The territorial aspect was also signifi cant in this 
10  D. Popławski, Między bezstronnością a solidarnością międzynarodową. Polityka 
bezpieczeństwa europejskich państwa neutralnych i bezaliansowych po zimnej wojnie (Be-
tween Impartiality and International Solidarity. Security Policy of a European Neutral and 
Non-alligned Countries after the Cold War), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 
2013, pp. 109–110.
11  W. Hummer, Solidarität versus Neutralität. Das immerwährend neutrale Österreich 
in der GASP vor und nach Nizza (Solidarity versus neutrality. The always neutral Austria 
in the CFSP before and after Nice), „Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift“, no. 2/2001, 
p. 153; S. Grillier, Die GASP und das Ende immerwährende Neutralität (The CFSP and 
the end of permanent neutrality), in: Rechtsfragen in der Anwendung des Amsterdamer 
Vertrages (Legal issues in the application of the Amsterdam Treaty), ed. W. Hummer, 
Manz, Wien 2001, p. 271.
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case. The solutions adopted referred only to the EU area, while outside 
the EU the traditional obligations resulting from neutrality would still 
apply. Such approach was often reduced to the slogan: ‘Solidarity with 
Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe’.12 
In the atmosphere of criticism from Brussels and diplomatic sanctions,13 
the centre-right coalition of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and 
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPŐ) started works on a new concept of 
Austrian security and preparation of a new defence doctrine. In the initial 
period of development the CSDP of the EU, Austrian society was very 
positive about it as well as about the plans to create a European army. In 
2002, the vast majority of Austrians (73%) supported such a solution.14 
This situation created a favourable climate for the regulations being 
implemented.
New defensive doctrine from 200115 was based on the concept of 
preventive measures used instead of reacting to existing threats. In fact, 
the principle of European solidarity has replaced the current concept of 
security policy. Austria’s orientation in the fi eld of security policy was 
defi ned as an alliance-free state (Bűndnissfrei). The term ‘neutrality’ was 
not used in the document.
 Undoubtedly, the Lisbon Treaty constituted another challenge for 
further positioning of Austrian neutrality. However, an unequivocal 
assessment of the importance of new regulations proved to be diffi cult 
to carry out. Certainly, the Lisbon Treaty threatened neutrality to much 
greater extent than the Nice Treaty. While the former suggested that the 
CSDP may lead to joint defence, the latter unequivocally stated that the 
common defence policy leads to joint defence, provided that the European 
Council so decides. It is undisputed at the same time, that common 
defence is incompatible with neutrality, irrespective of how neutrality is 
12  H.P. Neuhold., Comments on the Austrian Position, in: Challenges to Neutral and 
Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond, ed. E. Munro, Centre for Security Policy, 
Geneva 2004, p. 14.
13  Cf. W. Hummenr, A. Pelinka, Österreich unter ‘EG – Quarantäne‘. Die ‘Massnah-
men der 14‘ gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung aus Politik wissenschaftlichen und 
juristischer Sicht. Chronologie, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Austria under ‚EC-Quaran-
tine‘. The ‘measures of the 14’ against the Austrian federal government from a scientifi c 
and legal perspective. Chronology, commentary, documentation), Linde, Wien 2002.
14  P. Schmidt, J. Edthofer, Die EU ALS Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsunion: Das Mei-
nungsbild der ÖsterreicherInnen im Vergleich (The EU as a security and defense union: the 
opinion of Austrians in comparison), “ÖGIE. Policy Brief“, no. 20/2018.
15  Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin. Analyse-Teil. Bericht an der Nationalrat 
(Security and Defense Doctrine. Analysis part. Report to the National Council), Verfasst 
von einer Expertenkommission im Auftrag der Bundesregierung 23.01.2001, Wien 2002.
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interpreted. It should be noted that also in the case of the Lisbon Treaty 
Austria has referred to its specifi c safeguard clauses. 
First of all, the clauses include the possibility of abstaining from 
vote, in connection with the so-called second Irish clause, which ensures 
protection for the specifi c nature of the security and defence policy of 
the Member States. However, this clause is sometimes interpreted as the 
possibility of full exclusion of neutral and non-allied states from regulations 
applying to alliances. This is not only a far-reaching simplifi cation, but it 
also does not correspond to the intentions of these countries, in particular 
those of Austria,16 which has consistently advocated introduction of such 
regulations.
 Undoubtedly, a more favourable interpretation for Austria constitutes the 
concept of the so-called asymmetrical alliance commitments creating rights 
for neutral states and obligations for other EU members. This interpretation 
seems closer to reality. Thus, in specifi c cases, a neutral solidarity should be 
expected from neutral states, but not ‘blind solidarity’.17 Such expectations 
might be formulated on the basis of the fi rst words of Article 42 item 
7 regarding assistance with all available means. Obligations arising from 
neutrality may in this case constitute restriction of freedom of action.
There are also opinions that, despite the existence of protective 
mechanisms, Austria’s continued persistence in relation to its neutral 
status will lead in a long-term not only to the defi cit of legitimacy and 
loss of credibility among EU members, but also to serious challenges for 
the country in the area of  security policy.18 However, it seems that it is not 
the status itself, which has been modifi ed by subsequent amendments to 
the constitution, that is the source of the above mentioned problems. The 
dangers presented are mainly caused by the discrepancies between the 
declarations of successive Austrian governments and the actual actions 
taken in the fi eld of security policy. 
16  During negotiations on the constitutional treaty, the ÖVP-FPÖ government con-
sistently advocated the introduction of the alliance clause. Chancellor Schüssel said that 
the solution proposed by France, Germany and Great Britain is consistent with neutrality. 
Ultimately, Vienna had to withdraw from this position and supported Finland’s initiative to 
loose the general alliance clause and to rely to greater extent on the so-called Irish clause.
17  P. Hipold, Österreichs Neutralität nach Lissabon (Austria‘s neutrality after Lis-
bon), „Juristen Zeitung“, July 2010, p. 594.
18  U. Kranenpohl, A. Opitz, „Entaustrifi zierte” Neutralität: Rechtspolitische Wan-
delder ősterreichischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges 
(„Deaustrated“ neutrality: Legal policy change in Austrian foreign and security policy 
since the end of the Cold War), in: Im Dienst der internationalen Gemeinschaft-Österrech 
in der Vereiten Nationen (In the service of international community law in the United Na-
tions), ed. J. Troy, Institut für Politikwissenschaft Innsbruck, Innsbruck 2013, p. 73.
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The centre-right coalition was unequivocally considered as the 
fi rst government that presented a coherent view on Austria’s attitude 
towards NATO and the new defence policy within the EU. The thesis 
was also promoted that Austria should become a top leader in the fi eld 
of structured cooperation in order to belong to the avant-garde of the EU 
security policy from its very launching. It was emphasized that due to 
technical and logistical problems it would be advisable to join the battle 
group with the Czech Republic and Germany. As it turned out later, these 
plans were too far-reaching and Austria withdrew from this idea. The 
decision to purchase combat aircrafts in 2008 changed the situation only 
to little extent.
Declarations on the continuation of the armed forces reform and the 
purchase of new equipment should certainly be treated as an expression 
of constant improvement of combat capabilities in the context of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The new Security Strategy fi nally adopted in 2013 clearly 
dominates the comprehensive approach to security, covering its most 
important aspects, dimensions and institutions as well as explicitly 
relating to the principles of European solidarity.
However, the practical implementation of these assumptions faces nu-
merous barriers. Undoubtedly, one of the important reasons of the legiti-
macy defi cit was the systematically limited defence budget, which in 2009 
was still far from 1% of GDP. Problems were becoming increasingly appar-
ent and in 2014 media informed that Austrian army was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The budget subsidy did not exceed 0.5% of GDP. The third 
ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government has put a clear emphasis on restoring Aus-
trian defence capabilities, which had been largely neglected. At the same time, 
an increasing engagement in the area of  CSDP might be observed together 
with clear profi ling of Austrian activity in the area of  crisis management.19
The actions taken did not convince sceptics who continue to accuse 
Austria of ‘free-riding’ and taking advantage of neutrality in order not 
19  In offi cial publications from 2019, three areas of activity were indicated. First of 
all, the involvement within the Permanent Structured Cooperation was emphasized, in-
cluding participation in 4 projects together with France, Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary, 
among them – in the one related to effective protection against chemical, biological and ra-
diological war materials. As a response to insuffi cient protection of the EU borders, about 
1,000 soldiers were sent with the intention to be a formation assisting the police in protect-
ing Austrian borders. The third area was participation of approximately 1,000 soldiers in 
14 foreign missions and over 300 soldiers staying in constant readiness. Thus, well over 
2,000 soldiers permanently perform assigned tasks in the above area; Sicher. Und morgen? 
Sicherheitspolitische Jahresbericht 2019 (For sure. And tomorrow? Security policy annu-
al report 2019), Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Bundesministerium Landesverteidigung, 
Wien 2018, pp. 8–9.
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to take more responsibility for security at the EU level.20 As an initiative 
enabling alleviating Austria’s credibility defi cit abroad may be perceived, 
announced in July 2019, project of establishing the Civil Peace Service 
(Ziviler Friedensdienst) as a new foreign policy instrument. Modelled 
on German solutions, it would allow for the introduction of various 
methods of civil confl ict management, which in a concrete way contribute 
to overcoming violence, constructive and peaceful transformation of 
confl icts and protecting individuals against violence and human rights 
violations. Its goal should be long-lasting peace and reconciliation. The 
project was included in the new government agenda.21
The Perspective of Rejecting Neutrality
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR’s activated 
on the Austrian political scene forces openly calling for the rejection of 
neutrality and accession to NATO.22 Observation of Austrian political 
sphere made it possible for the author to conclude that during the rule of 
the ÖVP-FPÖ government coalitions, these demands increased, whereas 
the governments of the great coalition ÖVP-SPÖ were characterized 
by seeking compromise solutions, consisting in full compliance with 
obligations arising from participation in the CSDP, while neutralizing the 
endeavours to join NATO.
Modifi cation of Austria’s international status into ‘freedom from 
alliances’ at the beginning of the 21st century does not change its 
obligations regarding membership in military alliances. However, 
mainly in the area of  foreign and security policy, one can still fi nd 
specifi c relations between traditionally perceived neutrality and post-
neutrality. Austrian government, without directly referring to the formal 
international law status in a specifi c area, continued to implement the 
policy of neutrality, e.g. with regard to armed confl icts, in the absence 
of a UN position. 
20  H. Kramer, G. Matzner, P. Steyrer, Türkis-Blaue Aussen- und EU-Politik. Was wir 
zu erwarten haben (Turquoise-blue foreign and EU policies. What we can expect), „Inter-
national- Die Zeitschrift fűr internationale Politik“, no. 1/2018.
21  P. Hämmerle, T. Roithner, Ziviler Friedensdienst als Instrument ősterreichischen 
Aussenpolitik. Zwischenbilnas der Kampanigne (Civil peace service as an instrument of Au-
strian foreign policy. Interim balance of the campaign), Internationaler Versöhnungsbund, 
https://versoehnungsbund.at/zwishenbilanz-ziviler-friedensdinst (access 17.02.2020).
22  In the 1990 election campaign, FPÖ leader Jörg Haider argued that neutrality im-
posed on Austria is not justifi ed in post-Cold War conditions. This radical view was not 
widely supported among Austrian society attached to the country’s neutrality status. How-
ever, FPÖ in its 1997 election program was clearly in favour of the NATO membership.
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Although there could be many indications that today we can speak of 
Austria’s perpetual neutrality only in a normative aspect, the very idea of 
neutrality is still present in the political life of the country. In general, 
it may be observed that most members of Austria’s political elite are in 
favour of abandoning the traditional, broad formula of neutrality, which 
is identifi ed with the Cold War period. Thus, Austria has abandoned the 
‘holistic view of neutrality in favour of its narrow interpretation’.23 First 
of all, it should be taken into account that in the broad public perception 
freedom from alliances/non-alignment is very often considered as 
a modifi ed concept of neutrality, adapted to post-Cold War conditions and 
the EU membership. 
The ÖVP/FPÖ coalition governments, deleting neutrality from public 
space, assumed that rejection of neutrality is a purely legal issue. They 
argued that the hitherto modifi cation of neutrality in the constitution had 
not been called into question by the UN Security Council or by countries 
that were notifi ed of obligations regarding perpetual neutrality. Also when 
the so-called military articles of the State Treaty had been modifi ed, its 
signatories did not raise any objections. Thus, it was recognized that the 
sovereign shaping of relations with other countries was not prevented by 
the international law restrictions created by the State Treaty. Based on 
the above premises, the federal government and some experts have been 
treating actions, not only related to modifi cation but also to hypothetical 
abolition of neutrality, as lying within the exclusive competences of state 
authorities.24 
There exists also a different point of view. A signifi cant part of 
Austrian international law experts emphasize that in the international 
sense Austria is obliged to respect its neutrality because it was established 
by an international law act. Thus, it cannot be terminated unilaterally. 
Some representatives of Austrian international law doctrine also take the 
view that even if the government managed to obtain required majority to 
remove the constitutional bill on perpetual neutrality, the international 
legal status of the state would not be completely changed. 
Bearing in mind the diverse opinions present in Austrian international 
law doctrine and the polarization of positions of the country’s major 
23  J.L. Beyer, S.C. Hofmann., Varieties of neutrality: Norm revision and decline, “Co-
operation and Confl ict”, no. 3/2001, p. 303; C. Gebhard, Is Small Beatiful? The Case of 
Austria, “Swiss Political Science Review”, no. 9/2013, p. 17, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/fuul/10.1111/spsr.12042 (access 17.02.2020).
24  J. Niederberger, Ősterreichische Sicherheitspolitik zwischen Solidarität und Neu-
tralität (Austrian security policy between solidarity and neutrality), „Bulletin 2001 zur 
Schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik“ 2001, p. 78.
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political forces, the signifi cant attachment of Austrian society to the idea 
of  neutrality remains an important factor. The trends from the beginning 
of the 21st century, indicating a systematic decline in the importance of 
neutrality for the Austrians, have not persisted.25 At the same time, most 
respondents still support CSDP, although this support has been present 
since 2015 below the EU average (in 2018 – at the level of 57% with the 
EU average of 75%). This also means that in the public perception, CSDP 
development trends are generally not perceived as a threat to neutrality/
post-neutrality. 
The removal of neutrality from public space, characteristic of the early 
21st century, has clearly decreased in the second decade of the current 
century. In the Security Strategy of 2013 reference was made to the legal 
and constitutional basis of perpetual neutrality. Among the principles that 
should guide Austrian foreign and security policy were active intermediation 
in international confl icts and maintaining mediation capabilities resulting 
from ‘Austria’s position as both the EU member and a neutral state’.26
Taking into account both the internal and international aspects, it 
should be pointed out that modern neutrality analyzes are clearly shifting 
from law to politics. Therefore, any formal rejection of perpetual neutrality 
should also be seen in the context of the political will of accepting this 
fact by the states concerned, in particular the signatories of the State 
Treaty. Russia would undoubtedly play a signifi cant role in this process. 
In the Kremlin’s view, relations between the two countries have been 
characterized by stability, predictability and lack of signifi cant problems, 
and Austria is perceived in the categories of a ‘friendly pragmatist’.27 At 
the same time, however, Russia recognizes that the rejection of neutrality 
would be associated with Austria’s accession to NATO, in whose 
enlargement it is not in the slightest interested.
25  Opinion polls conducted in February 2019 show that neutrality is still important 
for 80% of Austrians (56% – very important, 24% – rather important, 11% – rather not 
important, 5% – not important). Regarding the creation of a European army, Austria is in 
the group of fi ve EU countries where minority is in favor of such a solution (2017 – 45%). 
The clearly outlined skepticism of the majority of the population has its source, among 
others, in a critical assessment of the EU military strength in the global ranking, which is 
deemed insuffi cient. M. Mohr, Wichtigkeit der Neutralität In Österreich (Importance of 
neutrality in Austria), 2019, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/992825/umfrage/
wichtigkeit-der-neutralitaet-in-oesterreich/ (access 14.12.2019).
26  Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie. Sicherheit in einer neue Dekade-Sicherheit 
gestalten (Austrian security strategy. Shaping security in a new decade), Bundeskanzler-
amt, Wien 2013, pp. 8, 20.
27  M. Raś, Austria w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej (Austria in the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation), “Studia Politica Germanica” 2014, p. 165.
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 It should be noted that recently, in the context of relations with 
Russia, the importance of neutrality/post-neutrality as a political attitude 
enabling the extension of the diplomatic instruments of a small state has 
been again recognized in the political circles of Austria. Vienna aspires to 
act as an intermediary between Russia and the European Union. Austrian 
press presents historical parallels comparing today’s situation to Kreisky’s 
activity towards the Palestine Liberation Organization.28 Austria is 
trying to play a similar role in disputes between Brussels and the Visegrad 
Group countries. Undoubtedly, there are some analogies to the active 
policy of neutrality of the Cold War period, which has been a trademark of 
Austrian foreign policy. Although the circumstances of such a policy are 
quite different, Austria sees in such international activity a possibility of 
strengthening its role and signifi cance within the European Union. This 
is favoured by the sentiments in Austrian society, where the predicted 
erosion of the importance of neutrality has not occurred.
Conclusions
Submission of application for the EU membership in 1989 constitutes 
a symbolic date of breaking the traditional principles of neutrality and 
joining the processes of European integration. The redefi nition of neutrality 
that has been taking place in the 1990s has decisively enabled membership 
in the community and a change in attitude towards armed confl icts. In 
accordance with the commitments made, the diffi cult process of adapting 
legal regulations to the requirements of membership was initiated, in 
particular as regards the possibility of full participation in cooperation in the 
fi eld of the CFSP. As a result, Austria shifted to the position of an alliance-
free state. However, the constitutional bill on perpetual neutrality of 1955 is 
still in force, and is unlikely to be overruled in the foreseeable future. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the process of polarization of the 
Austrian political scene around the question of rejecting perpetual 
neutrality and joining NATO has progressed. ÖVP/FPÖ governments 
were proponents of the rejection of neutrality, while the great ÖVP/
SPÖ coalitions accepted compromise solutions. At the same time, the 
process of eliminating neutrality from public sphere has been clearly 
noticeable. Within the society, the idea of  neutrality is still present. The 
freedom from alliances formula is understood by a signifi cant number of 
Austria’s citizens as a modifi ed neutrality, adapted to modern conditions. 
It remains unclear whether the hypothetical rejection of neutrality lies 
28  „Der Standard“, 19.02.2019.
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within the exclusive competence of state authorities. Despite numerous 
declarations of signifi cant commitment to the development of the CSDP, 
and in particular Permanent Structured Cooperation, Austria’s activities 
in this area have been far from suffi cient. 
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